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## Viewing cable 05LIMA4078, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPO)

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #[05LIMA4078](#).

Reference ID      Created      Released      Classification      Origin

[05LIMA4078](#) [2005-09-19 22:04](#) [2011-08-30 01:44](#) [SECRET](#)      [Embassy Lima](#)

Appears in these articles:

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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 004078

SIPDIS

NOFORN  
SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR DS/DSS/ITA AND DS/IP/WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2015  
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [PE](#)  
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPO)

REF: STATE 162859

Classified By: RSO JAMES D. LEMARIE FOR REASON 1.4 (C)

**11.** (SBU) In response to Reference A, Embassy Lima provides the following information for use in the preparation of the DS/DSS/ITA Security Environment Threat List (SETL). Responses are cued to questions posed in the SEPO reporting guideline:

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE  
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**11.** (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS:

**1A.** Yes. There is a small Islamic community in Lima that is capable of carrying out Anti-American demonstrations. The same is true of an even smaller Pakistani community centered in Tacna.

**1B.** Yes. There are occasional anti-U.S. or anti-imperialist demonstrations in Peru on behalf of coca growers or groups who protest against the U.S. Government's counter-narcotics support for the Government of Peru's (GOP) program. There have been none by Muslims or Pakistanis, however.

**1C.** Yes. There were several demonstrations in Lima at the COMR and the Chancery. Also, there have been minor protests near U.S. counter-narcotics facilities in both Tingo Maria and Pucallpa.

**1D.** Varies from less than 100 to more than 3,000.

**1E.** Domestic issues and U.S. foreign policy initiatives often trigger these demonstrations.

**1F.** These protests are generally peaceful, but protestors have been known to destroy or vandalize property in the past.

**1G.** Yes. Protestors have damaged Narcotics Assistance Section operated USG equipment. In one instance, NAS helicopters received relatively minor damage from rock-throwers during a counter-narcotics operation in the Monzon Valley. NAS officials believe the rocks were thrown by militant cocaleros operating in the valley. In April 2005, three NAS helicopters, manned by Peruvian police, were damaged by automatic weapons fire when suspected SL operatives attacked an eradication operation. During the past year, no U.S. personnel were injured during any demonstrations or hostile action. The threat from the combination of cocaleros and narcotraffickers potentially in conjunction with local terrorists poses a very real threat to USG and host country alternative development projects and policies in Peru.

**1H.** No. Demonstrators have not penetrated our perimeter security lines.

**1I.** Yes, anti-government demonstrations occur on an almost daily basis.

**1J.** Yes. Demonstrations have taken place near U.S. diplomatic facilities. The Ambassador's Residence (CMR) is located on one of the main routes typically used by demonstrators, and it is not uncommon for up to 2000 demonstrators to pass by the CMR on any given day.

**1K.** The size of demonstrations can vary from a few dozen to several thousand.

**1L.** These demonstrations are generally peaceful, but destruction of property and vandalism can occur. Moreover, there were several instances when crowds turned hostile, blocked the streets and/or highways, and burned tires in protest of either the GOP or poor working conditions.

**1M.** No. To date, these demonstrations have not resulted in damage to USG property.

#### **12. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS:**

**1A.** Yes. The host country is currently engaged in an intrastate conflict consisting of Government military and police fighting an intermittent irregular war with domestic terrorists. The terrorists have expressed support for illicit coca growers and provide protection to drug traffickers.

**1B.** This conflict is generally limited to specific regions (i.e., mainly the drug producing areas of the Upper Huallaga, Apurimac, and Ene River Valleys). However, the main domestic terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso (SL) has proven it can carry out operations in Lima. In March 2002, SL operatives detonated a car bomb across the street from the U.S. Embassy in Lima, killing 10 and injuring more than 40. In early September, 2005, the National Anti-Terrorism Court convicted one of the eight defendants on trial for the attack and sentenced him to a 30-year prison term. The seven other defendants were acquitted of involvement in the attack, but three were found guilty of belonging to the Sendero Luminoso terrorist organization and sentenced to prison terms of 20-25 years.

**1C.** There are no declared diplomatic facilities, but there are U.S. counter narcotics Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in the listed areas outside of Lima.

**1D.** Yes. Sendero Luminoso has demonstrated an anti-American orientation.

#### **13. (S) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES:**

**1A.** The level of professionalism and training varies between units (poor to average), with specialized units (such as SWAT, Bomb Squad, Rescue, etc.) being more professional and better trained/equipped than the regular police forces. Low salaries and morale detract from professionalism.

**1B.** Yes, many of these units have been trained by U.S. agencies to varying degrees.

**1C.** Yes, corruption is endemic and debilitating, with appropriate vetting and precautions the mission is able to work effectively with local law enforcement agencies.

**1D.** The intelligence services have a varied ability to deter terrorist actions. Some of the police intelligence (DIRIN) and counter-terrorist (DIRCOTE) units are effective at deterring terrorist actions, but other units lack the

necessary funding, manpower, and training to fully deter terrorist actions.

**E.** Peruvian intelligence services have been very cooperative with U.S. Embassy requests for information and support. The National Intelligence Council (CNI) is being rebuilt from scratch following several years of being suborned by its former intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, for personal political and financial gain. However, the CNI has demonstrated a willingness to fully cooperate with the U.S. Embassy and shares information on a regular basis.

**F.** Host country services have scored anti-terrorism successes within the last 12 months. In November 2004, DIRCOTE captured Arturo Chumpitaz ((AGUIRRE)), the head of the Sendero Luminoso Metropolitan Committee in Lima. Also, Peruvian authorities arrested Jaime Zuniga ((CORDOBA)) in November. Zuniga was considered one of Sendero Luminoso's primary leaders of the Proseguir faction. On the other hand, host country officials also suffered setbacks in their war against SL. In February 2005, SL operatives ambushed and killed three PNP highway patrol officers, in the Department of San Martin. In April 2005, narco-terrorists, presumed to be SL, attacked an eradication operation in the area south of Santa Lucia, opening fire on helicopters belonging to the Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section manned by Peruvian police. Two weeks later, police arrested three individuals believed to have been involved in the ambush. In May 2005, suspected SL operatives detonated an explosive device in front of a NGO office in Aucayacu, causing slight damage to the front of the building. In July 2005, narco-terrorists ambushed a PNP patrol squad in the San Martin province, killing three people. One of the suspected ringleaders in the attack was arrested three days later by DIRCOTE police.

**G.** Yes. The host country is normally very responsive to Embassy requests for protective security.

**H.** The Embassy assesses as very good the overall security at major airports (Lima, Arequipa, Cusco) in the country; at smaller regional airports, security is poor. This security rating relates to physical security, however, as procedural security, relating to document fraud and alien smuggling, is poor at all airports.

**I.** Immigration control agencies are generally considered ineffective due to high levels of corruption and a lack of resources. Illegal immigrants and potential terrorists can easily enter and depart the country with little worry of inspection by host country immigration services. Customs has not been effective in screening outgoing cargo for drugs.

**J.** Border patrol forces are generally considered ineffective due to a lack of resources and serious corruption. Peru's jungles, bordering Brazil, Colombia, and Bolivia are extremely difficult to control and are very porous.

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INDIGENOUS TERRORISM  
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**14. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS:**

**A.** Yes. There are indigenous anti-American terrorist groups in Peru.

**B.** Two main groups - Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).

**C.** No. These groups have not carried out an anti-American attack within the last 12 months.

**D.** No. However, attacks in previous years were extremely lethal.

**E.** Yes. These groups have attacked U.S. diplomatic targets, but not within the past year.

**F.** Yes, these groups have attacked U.S. business, military, or U.S.-related targets, but not within the past year.

**G.** Recent SL attacks against Peruvian government forces and facilities are mainly confined to specific regions, although SL retains the capability to conduct isolated attacks anywhere in the country. MRTA has not conducted any attacks in a number of years. Although credible information on MRTA capabilities has been difficult to obtain in the recent past, their ability to carry out attacks is considered greatly diminished.

**H.** There are no declared diplomatic facilities in the regions where they are most active. However, there are U.S. counter-narcotics Forward Operating Locations in these areas (Pucallpa and Tingo Maria). Also, NAS and DEA personnel carry out counter-narcotics operations on a temporary basis from host country police and military bases in the

Apurimac/Ene River Valleys. AID personnel also support development projects in these areas.

**15. (U) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS:**

**1A.** No. There are no other known indigenous terrorist groups (not anti-American) in country.

**1B.** N/A

**1C.** N/A

**1D.** N/A

**1E.** N/A

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**TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM**  
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**16. (S) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS:**

**1A.** Yes. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have a presence in Peru. Also the possibility exists that there are Islamic extremists who transit Peru or operate in the southern Department of Tacna and perhaps even in Lima. Also, although classified as an indigenous terrorist group, SL and MRTA do have supporters outside of Peru.

**1B.** FARC presence in Peru is considered to be limited to support, finance and propaganda activities.

**1C.** No. The host country is not sympathetic to these groups.

**1D.** Embassy Lima is not aware of any suspect Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) in the country that have a relationship with any of these groups.

**1E.** Yes. There are Muslims, primarily Pakistanis, who are possibly sympathetic to Islamic extremists. Most of them live in the Department of Tacna, along the southern border with Chile.

**1F.** The EAC assesses the level, intent, and scope of hostile intelligence services in country relative to potential anti-American terrorist acts to be very low.

**1G.** Weapons and explosives are readily available throughout the country either by purchase or theft. Also, corrupt government officials and porous borders facilitate illicit arms transfers into and out of the country.

POWERS